Implications of Decision Making Research for Decision Support and Displays by Morrison, Jeffrey G. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1998
Implications of Decision Making
Research for Decision Support and Displays
Morrison, Jeffrey G.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41221
To appear in J. A. Cannon-Bowers & E. Salas (Eds.), Decision Making Under Stress:
Implications for Training and Simulation.
Implications of Decision Making Research for Decision Support and Displays
Jeffrey G. Morrison Richard T. Kelly & Ronald A. Moore Susan G. Hutchins
NCCOSC RDT&E Division (NRaD) Pacific Science & Engineering Group, Inc. Naval Postgraduate School
San Diego, CA San Diego, CA Monterey, CA
Abstract
A prototype decision support system (DSS) was developed to enhance Navy tactical decision
making based on naturalistic decision processes.  Displays were developed to support critical
decision making tasks through recognition-primed and explanation-based reasoning processes,
and cognitive analysis was conducted of the decision making problems faced by Navy tactical
officers in a shipboard Combat Information Center.  Baseline testing in simulations of high
intensity, peace keeping, littoral missions indicated that experienced decision makers were not
well served by current systems, and their performance revealed periodic loss of situation
awareness.  A study is described with eight expert Navy tactical decision making teams who used
either their current system alone or in conjunction with the prototype DSS.  When the teams had
the prototype DSS available, we observed significantly fewer communications to clarify the
tactical situation, significantly more critical contacts identified early in the scenario, and a
significantly greater number of defensive actions taken against imminent threats.  These findings
suggest that the prototype DSS enhanced the commanders’ awareness of the tactical situation,
which in turn contributed to greater confidence, lower workload, and more effective
performance.  Significant work remains to be done in learning how to optimally design and train
users of such systems.
INTRODUCTION
It is our premise that for human decision makers to be effective, they must foremost be
able to access the data necessary to make a decision when it is needed, where it is needed, and in
the form it is needed.  The data must be integrated and organized so that they become useful as
information to the user.  Information must be meaningful, timely, and organized in a way that is
consistent with how it is going to be used. The effects the operational environment may have on
the human operators of a system complicate understanding how an operator uses information.
The U.S. Navy has recognized the criticality of such factors in assuring mission effectiveness and
minimizing incidents of blue-on-blue (friendly) or blue-on-white (neutral) engagements.  As
noted in Chapter 1 of this book, the Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) program
was initiated in response to one such incident: the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian Airbus
aircraft by the USS Vincennes in 1988.  The congressional investigation of this incident
suggested that emotional stress may have played a role in contributing to this incident, and the
TADMUS program was established to assess how stress might affect decision making and what
might be done to minimize those effects.  In any human-machine system, there are three possible
approaches to addressing the human-machine system integration problem.  You may select
particular people based on their skills and abilities.   You may train people to enhance their skills
and provide them knowledge to make optimal use of the system and their own capabilities and
limitations.  Finally, you may design the machine component of the system to better
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TADMUS program was that the Navy had evolved a fundamentally effective system for selecting
its commanders and tactical decision makers in the Aegis Combat system.  It was, however,
plausible that we could make some significant contributions in improving the utility of these
complex person-machine systems through the application of emerging theories of cognition and
models of decision making to the areas of training and system design.  Other chapters in this
book address many of the training tools and techniques developed as part of the TADMUS
program to facilitate effective decision making in real-time tactical systems.  This chapter will
address the on-going work in developing improved human-system integration (HSI) for tactical
decision makers.
Cognitive Analysis of Decision Tasks
Recent theories of decision making emphasize the importance of situation assessment for
good decision making in naturalistic, event-driven situations. Moreover, they stress that decisions
regarding actions to be taken are a by-product of developing the situation awareness that
precedes action selection. Early TADMUS work focused on a family of cognitive theories which
have come to be known as “naturalistic” decision making (Klein, 1989; Klein, Orasanu,
Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993).  Naturalistic decision making differs from that found in the
artificial intelligence / expert system literature in that these models are typically focused on
emulating the outcomes of expert decision making by emulating the process a human decision
maker might use in reaching the outcome.  An example of these models is the analytic approach
taken by many computers in playing chess.  These programs typically consider all possible moves
and counter-moves in a computationally intensive manner, and then make a move based on the
best solution from this exhaustive analysis.  Human decision makers do not use this exhaustive,
analytic approach, particularly not expert decision makers.  The human expert will typically look
at a situation, and use some general heuristic derived from his/her previous experience to choose
an action.  With regard to tactical decision making in a single ship, peace-keeping mission,
Klein’s work found that usually the situation itself either determines or constrains the response
options and that experienced decision makers make up to 90% of all decisions without
considering alternatives. If the situation appears similar to one that the decision maker has
previously experienced, the pattern will be recognized and the course of action is usually
immediately obvious. This has come to be known as “recognition-primed decision making”
(RPD; Klein, 1989, 1993).  On the other hand, if the situation does not seem familiar, a more
complex form of decision making will be involved where the decision maker considers general
classes of explanations, selects from those that seem plausible to create a working hypothesis,
and then rapidly adjusts this hypothesis after evaluating it.  This less common form of decision
making is referred to as “explanation-based reasoning” (EBR).  In effect, this is decision making
by telling a story to explain the discrepancies between expectations and what actually happens.
As with RPD, the reasoning is not exhaustive but fairly short and concise, and the expert decision
maker rapidly develops a reasonable hypothesis to explain the situation.
Additional support for these findings was found in an analysis of how experienced
commanders make tactical decisions in realistic situations. Research was conducted to determine
the decision requirements for command-level decision makers in the combat information center
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Of these, 103 concerned situation assessments. Decision makers arrived at 87% of their situation
assessments through feature matching and the remaining 13% through story generation (Kaempf,
Wolf, & Miller, 1993).  Feature matching strategies involve comparisons of observed data to sets
of distinctive features or cues held in memory and based on the decision maker’s training and
experiences.  When a match occurs, as a result of conscious or more automatic processes, the
meaning of the observed situation becomes evident along with the appropriate responses.  Story
generation, on the other hand, involves more active EBR processes in which decision makers
attempt to build a coherent story that accommodates the observed data, thereby providing a
plausible interpretation of the situation.  Story generation typically occurs when the patterns of
observed data are unfamiliar or insufficient to allow a match to features of known situations held
in memory.
The other eighty decisions that were identified from analysis of the real-world incidents
mentioned above, involved course of action selection.  Selecting courses of action involves
determining what actions need to be undertaken in order to deal effectively with a particular
situation.  Kaempf, et al. (1993) distinguished between strategies for course of action selection
where decision makers recognized the appropriate courses of action for the situation, selected a
course of action from among multiple options, or generated a single, custom course of action that
fits the details of the situation.  These course of action decisions served a variety of functions,
although relatively few were intended to end the incident. Twenty were intended as a final course
of action decision, 14 were implemented to obtain more information, 22 to manage resources,
and 24 to put themselves in a more favorable tactical position. A recognition-based strategy was
used by decision makers to develop a final course of action most of the time.  This strategy
accounted for 95% of the actions taken in the 14 simulated incidents. The decision makers
generated and compared multiple options in only 5% of the cases. In line with these findings, the
TADMUS program has adopted the position that decision support systems should assist in the
decision making process and focus on aiding the situation assessment portion of the decision
making task.
Baseline tests in representative littoral scenarios further corroborated these analyses of
decision making in tactical decision making among expert decision makers (Hutchins &
Kowalski, 1993; Hutchins, Morrison, & Kelly, 1996).  An analysis of communications patterns
indicated a predominance of feature matching strategies in assessing the situation, typically
followed by the selection among preplanned response sets (tactics) that were considered to fit the
situation.  These tests also suggested that experienced decision makers were not particularly well
served by current systems in demanding missions.  Teams exhibited periodic losses of situation
awareness, often linked with limitations in human memory and shared attention capacity.
Environmental stressors such as time compression and highly ambiguous information increased
decision biases, e.g. confirmation bias, hypervigilance, and task fixation, and were correlated
with tactical errors in executing the missions.  Hutchins cited several specific problems
associated with short term memory limitations, including:
(a) Mixing up track (contact) numbers (track being recalled as 7003 vs. 7033) and
forgetting track numbers;
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closing vs. opening in range, etc.) and forgetting track kinematic data; and
(c) Associating past track related events/actions with the wrong track and associating
completed own-ship actions with the wrong track.
Problems noted by Hutchins that related to decision biases included:
(a) Carrying initial threat assessment throughout the scenario regardless of new
information (framing error); and
(b) Assessing a track based on information other than that associated with the track, e.g.,
old intelligence data, assessments of similar tracks, outcomes of unrelated events, past
decision maker experiences, etc. (e.g. confirmation bias).
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM DESIGN
In order to address these problems, development of a prototype decision support system
(DSS) became the focus of the TADMUS HSI development effort.  The objective of this effort
was to evaluate and demonstrate display concepts derived from current cognitive theory with
expert decision makers in an appropriate test environment.  The focus of the DSS was on
enhancing the performance of tactical decision makers (viz., the Commanding Officer (CO) and
Tactical Action Officer (TAO) working as a team) for single ship, air defense missions in high
density, ambiguous littoral warfare situations.  The approach taken in designing the DSS was to
analyze the cognitive tasks performed by the decision makers in a shipboard CIC, and then to
develop a set of display modules to support these tasks based on the underlying decision making
processes naturally used by the CO-TAO team.
Given that the CO and TAO decision makers were behaving in a manner consistent with
those predicted by “naturalistic” decision making theory (Klein, 1993), this theory became
central to the design of a human-computer interface to improve tactical decision making.  A
prototype DSS was developed with the objectives of:  (1) minimizing the mismatches between
cognitive processes and the data available in the CIC to facilitate decision making; (2) mitigating
the short comings of current CIC displays in imposing high information processing demands and
exceeding the limitations of human memory; and (3) transferring the data in the current CIC from
numeric to graphical representations wherever appropriate.  It was determined that the DSS
should not filter or extensively process data; i.e., it should support rather than aid (automate)
decision making and leave as much decision making with the human decision makers as
possible.  The design goal of the DSS was to take the data that are already available in the system
and present them as meaningful information where, when, and in the form needed relative to the
decision making tasks being performed.
DSS-1 Design
Version 1 of the DSS (DSS-1) was designed expressly for the evaluation of display
elements to support feature matching, story generation (viz., RPD and EBR) with the goal of
reducing errors, reducing workload, and improving adherence to rules of engagement.  The
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and usefulness for the operational community.  It was implemented on a Macintosh computer to
operate independent of, synchronized with, or linked to a scenario driver simulation.  The design
of DSS-1 was constrained by practical and research requirements.  It was never intended to
represent a display to be used aboard ship.  The display was designed to complement an existing
Aegis geo-plot display so that performance could be evaluated with the Aegis geo-plot as a
baseline condition for comparison purposes.
Figure 1 shows the DSS-1 prototype display.  The DSS is a composite of a number of
distinct display modules.  Modules are arranged in a tiled format so that no significant data are
obscured by overlapping windows.  The DSS was conceived as a supplementary display to
complement the existing geo-plot and text displays in current CICs.  DSS modules have been
discussed and demonstrated in detail elsewhere (cf. Moore, Quinn, & Morrison, 1996).
Nevertheless, three of the modules will be discussed in more detail as an illustration of how the
information requirements of tactical decision making tasks were mapped with cognitive
processes described in naturalistic decision making theory to generate the DSS.
Track Profile
The track profile module consists of two graphical displays in the upper portion of the
DSS that show the current position of a selected track in both horizontal and plan-form displays.
Information requirements addressed by this module included the need to:  (1) see where the track
is relative to own-ship, (2) see what the track has been doing over time, (3) recognize whether the
track can shoot you, and (4) recognize whether you could shoot the track.  An important aspect of
this display is that it shows a historical plot of what the track has done in space and time (the
history is redrawn each time the track is selected).  This greatly reduces the short term memory
requirements on the CO and TAO in interpreting the significance of the selected track.  This
historical dimension of the display allows the decision maker to see what the track has done and
primes his recognition of a likely mission for that track which could account for its actions.  In
addition, the profiles show own-ship weapon and track threat envelopes displayed in terms of
range and altitude so that the decision maker can visualize and compare mental models
(templates) as he considers possible track intentions and own ship options.
6Figure 1.  DSS Version 1
Response Manager
The response manager is located immediately below the track profile and is tied to it via a
line indicating the track’s current distance from own ship.  It represents a Gantt chart type display
showing a template of pre-planned actions and the optimal windows in which to perform them.
The display serves as a graphical embodiment of battle orders and doctrine, and it shows which
actions have been taken with regard to the selected track.  The display is intended to support
RPD and serves the need to: (1) recall the relevant tactics and strategies for the type of track
being assessed, (2) recognize which actions need to be taken with the track and when they should
be taken, and (3) remember which actions have been taken and have yet to be taken for the
selected track.
Basis for Assessment
This module is located in the lower left area of the DSS and is intended to support EBR
(story generation).  The basis for assessment module presents the underlying data used to
generate the DSS’s threat assessment for the displayed track.  The display shows three categories
of assessment on which decision makers focus: potential threat, non-threat, or unknown.  The
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tabular format within three categories: supporting evidence, counter evidence, and assumptions.
These categories were found to be at the core of all story generation in which commanders
engage while deciding whether a track with the potential to be a threat is, in fact, a real threat.
This EBR related to threat assessment is also typically one of the decision making tasks
performed when deciding whether to fire on a track or not.  The display was designed to present
the relevant data necessary for a commander to consider and evaluate all likely explanations for
what a target may be, and what it may be doing (i.e., “intents”) through the generation of
alternative stories to explain the available and missing data regarding the track in question.  The
display is also intended to highlight data discrepant with a given hypothesis to minimize
confirmation and framing biases.  Assumptions listed are those assumptions necessary to “buy
into” the selected assessment.   As a result, the basis for assessment module was expected to be
particularly effective in helping sort out and avoid “Blue-on-Blue” (i.e., mistakenly shooting
friendly contacts) and “Blue-on-White” (i.e., mistakenly shooting neutral contacts) engagements.
Other DSS-1 Modules
Track Summary.  The track summary module is located in the upper left of DSS-1.  It
summarizes current data related to a selected track.  It is intended to support “quick look” RPD
processes via data related to track kinematics and overall status (threat, neutral or friendly) of the
target.  It was designed in response to the mental conversion and readability deficiencies of
character read-out (CRO) displays in the current CIC displays.  This window also supports a drop
down track list to rapidly select the individual track to be displayed, listed in priority order.
Comparison to Norms.  The comparison to norms module is located adjacent to the basis
for assessment  module.  It determines how well the observed data for a track fit the established
threat / non-threat norms for that type of track.  For instance, if the historical data seen for a track
classified as hostile are consistent with established normal operating range (tactical norms) for a
hostile track, then there is a good fit of the data to the hypothesis with regard to the parameter.  If
the data are outside tactical norms for what the track would be expected to do given its
classification, but within its operational capabilities, then it is a questionable fit.  If the data are
clearly inconsistent with that expected for that type of track with the current classification there is
a poor fit.  The relative fit is shown by one of three colors in columns of color-coded “chips”.
Theoretically, the appearance of any misfit colors would signal the decision maker that there is
ambiguous or conflicting data about the track, and cause him to consider alternative explanations
/ classifications for the track.  In addition, this module supports EBR by allowing tactical deci-
sion makers to access detailed historical information summarizing the data categories for this
track.
Track Priority List & Alerts List.  This module is located at the bottom of the DSS display
and is intended to support the decision maker in his attempt to maintain general situation
awareness, i.e., the “big picture.”  It is intended to help the decision maker manage his own
cognitive resources / attention. The track priority list presents the four highest priority tracks as
well as a fifth track of special interest to the decision maker. The alerts list is linked to the track
8priority list.  It normally displays the last alert issued for each displayed track.  Clicking and
holding the alert pulls up a list of all alerts in the system that have been issued for that track.
DSS-2 Design
Figure 2 shows the current DSS-2 prototype display.  The DSS-2 is a composite of
several display modules, which have been adapted from DSS-1 based on user comments and
performance tests. The DSS-2 is implemented with two 1024x768 CRT touch screen displays.
The display features an integrated geo-plot and a variety of modules designed to solve specific
decision making problems encountered by the tactical decision maker.  These modules will be
described below as an illustration of how the information requirements of tactical decision
making tasks were integrated  with the cognitive processes described by naturalistic decision
making theory.
Figure 2. TADMUS DSS Integrated Display
Geo-Plot
The geo-plot occupies the left side of the DSS-2 display, shown in Figure 2.  A close-up
of the geo-plot is provided in Figure 3.  The display uses variable-coded Navy Tactical Data
System (NTDS) symbology (Nugent, 1996; Osga & Keating, 1994; Rausche, 1995) to represent
the position of air, surface, and sub-surface tracks over a geographic region.  The module is
intended to be the primary focus of decision makers and is designed for quick decision making
associated with situation awareness and RPD processes.  It does, however, also contain other
geographic detail that could support EBR processes.  Symbols are color and shape coded to
indicate track identification and threat evaluation, and may be toggled between NTDS symbols
and track numbers.  Track numbers are the “language” of the CIC and allow rapid location of
various tracks.  Conceptually, the map consists of several layers, which may be altered to suit
particular mission requirements.  Shown is a desaturated map (Jacobsen, 1986; Van Orden &
Benoit, 1994) which provides sufficient spatial reference for most tasks while minimizing screen
clutter and excessive color for most decision making problems.  For strike or search and rescue
missions, a topographical map may be overlaid to provide a more relevant context in which to
frame tactical decisions.  Likewise, overlays for infrastructure (highways, population densities,
9power grids, etc.) may be added when necessary to further enhance the decision making context.
The use of a 2-dimensional representation ensures that tracks can be located quickly with
precision.  An optional 3-dimensional display could be shown when appropriate for assessing
general spatial relations.  This display has not as yet been fully implemented, and no data have
been collected to validate its potential utility.  Controls for altering the geo-plot are arranged
along the left edge of the module.  In addition to selecting map layers, scaling, and panning
controls, the decision maker may supplement the display with velocity leaders to show the
relative speed of all the tracks, with course histories which show a track’s path over time relative
to landmarks, with air corridors, and with other tracks.  Weapon threat envelopes may be
displayed for potential threat tracks along with own ship to rapidly assess the criticality of a
threat.
Note that DSS-1 operated in conjunction with a geo-plot, but that display was
independent of the DSS and had much less functionality, particularly with respect to overlays and
alternate map types.  Based on extensive comments and decision performance data from
operational users, the DSS-2 was designed to incorporate the geo-plot as an integral part of the
command display.  This not only simplifies the human-computer interface dialog by reducing the
control actions required but also promotes better situation awareness by making it easier for
decision makers to access and use all available tactical data displayed on the DSS.
Figure 3. Geo-Plot with Desaturated Map and Variable Coded Symbology
Multi-CRO Access Panel
Across the bottom of the DSS-2 display is a series of buttons for quick access to the
highest priority tracks. A close-up view of one of these buttons is shown in Figure 4.  The
buttons serve as miniature character read outs (Mini-CROs), displaying critical identification and
kinematic information about the track and allowing the status of the most critical tracks to be
monitored without additional interaction with the system. The buttons are arranged by a fairly
simple algorithm in terms of their threat priority, with highest priority on the left and lower
priority on the right.  As situations evolve, the movement of the buttons quickly draws attention
to the changes, which helps preclude attention fixation to a single track or task when the decision
maker is under stress.  Thus, the collection of Mini-CROs in this panel is intended to support
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RPD processes.  The relative position of each Mini-CRO, the color coding of threat level, and the
summary of critical track information all support rapid feature matching by experienced tactical
decision makers.
Figure 4. Sample Mini-CRO
In the lower right of each track button is an alert button.  This alert button is cyan-colored
when a new alert has occurred and gray when there are no new alerts.  Pressing and holding the
alert button generates a pop-up window to display a chronological list of alerts that have occurred
for the selected track.  Track age is shown rather than the time at which they occurred (as is the
case with current systems) because decision makers are more interested in how old the alert is
rather than when it occurred.  This feature, which may be activated by users on demand,
contributes to their periodic need to engage in EBR processes.  This implementation is an
adaptation of the Alerts List in DSS-1, based on feedback from operational users.
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Track Profile
The track profile, which is shown in Figure 5, is substantially the same as in DSS-1.  The
track profile module complements the geo-plot by showing a horizontal display of track altitude
and range from own ship. Information requirements addressed by this module include the need
to:  (1) see where the track is now, (2) what the track has been doing over time, (3) recognize
whether the track can shoot you, and (4) recognize whether you could shoot the track - all at a
glance.  The track profile also shows own-ship weapon and track threat envelopes displayed in
terms of range and altitude so that the decision maker can visualize and compare mental models
(templates) as he considers possible track intentions and own ship options.  Thus, it supports
RPD processes by experienced tactical decision makers.
To further facilitate these evaluations, the DSS-2 track profile incorporates two pull-down
lists.  The “perspective picker” allows the decision maker to jump to other friendly (including air,
surface, or land) forces in the area so as to assess the possibility that other assets are the target of
interest to a potentially hostile track, and to assess whether those friendly units could assist in
engaging a prospective threat.  When an alternative perspective is chosen, all modules in the
display reflect the perspective and capabilities of the chosen asset.  The second pull-down list is a
“weapons picker” that further elaborates on capabilities and limitations of own ship and other
friendly units showing how different weapons could be used against the selected track.  In the
event that a weapon system goes off-line, such information would automatically be reflected in
the weapons displayed in the pull-down list.  These capabilities are expected to play a significant
role in joint (multi-service) and coalition (multi-national) operations.
Figure 5. Track Profile with Aspect Inset
Embedded within the track profile is an inset window which shows own ship heading
relative to the selected track.  The display quickly shows radar cross section and weapons cut
outs for assessing whether own ship should be maneuvered to optimize these parameters.
Response Manager
The response manager is located immediately below the track profile and is linked to it
via a line indicating the contact’s current distance from own ship.  As shown in Figure 6, it
provides a Gantt chart type display, similar to that used in DSS-1, showing a set of pre-planned
actions and the optimal range windows in which to perform them.  The display serves as a
graphical embodiment of battle orders and doctrine, and shows which actions have been taken
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with regard to the selected track.  The display is intended to support RPD and serves the need to:
(1) recall the relevant tactics and strategies for the type of target being assessed, (2) recognize
which actions need to be taken with the target and when they should be taken, and (3) remember
which actions have been taken and have yet to be taken for the selected target.
Figure 6. Response Manager
Track Summary
The track summary module, shown in Figure 7, provides a more detailed summary of
current and historical data for the currently selected track than was provided in DSS-1.
Revisions were motivated by feedback from operational users about the DSS-1. The revised
display provides a quick-look at the track’s kinematics as well as ancillary data, such as available
intelligence, electronic warfare (EW) and Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF).  Current
information is shown as a cyan color, while historical or supplementary data is grayed-out.
Kinematics (quantitative data) are read down from the track number while track ID (verbal data)
are read across.  Embedded within all CROs is a unique feature of the DSS - an altitude trend
arrow that shows increasing, constant or decreasing altitude.  This is a critical feature of
assessing threat intent that must be inferred by the tactical decision maker using conventional
systems.  There is a large pop-up window which may be accessed to provide a larger view of
(possibly) more detailed alerts.  This module is expected to be used when more detailed
information is required for EBR.
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Figure 7. Track Summary
Basis for Assessment
The basis for assessment module is shown in Figure 8.  It is similar in format to DSS-1,
although substantial revisions are still under development.  The basis for assessment module was
explicitly designed to support EBR by providing a detailed list of evidence for and against the
current assessment of the selected track.  It also presents unknown information and implicit
assumptions being made in accepting the assessment of potential threat, non-threat, or unknown.
This module supports EBR (story generation) by allowing the decision maker to explore
alternative hypotheses and to see how the available data do or do not support them. The basis for
assessment module presents the underlying data used to generate the DSS’s threat assessment for
the displayed track. The display was designed to present the relevant data necessary for a
commander to consider and evaluate all likely explanations for what a target may be, and what it
may be doing (i.e., assess “intents”) through the generation of alternative stories to explain the
available and missing data regarding the target in question.  The display is also intended to
highlight data discrepant with a given hypothesis in order to minimize confirmation and framing
biases.  Assumptions listed are those necessary to “buy into” the selected assessment.  Further,
the assumptions are intended to prompt the decision maker to consider ways to resolve
ambiguity.  For instance, in order to assess a track as a threat, it may be necessary to assume that
the track is carrying a weapon.   The decision maker could then use organic assets such as
friendly aircraft in the vicinity to fly out to the track to assess whether this is actually the case.
As a result, the basis for assessment module is expected to be particularly effective in helping
sort out and avoid “Blue-on-Blue” and “Blue-on-White” engagements.
Figure 8.  Basis for Assessment
DSS EVALUATION EXPERIMENT
The ultimate goal of any display design is to positively influence the performance of the
person-machine system of which it is a part.  Therefore, a study was performed to examine how
the DSS impacted the decision making of COs and TAOs relative to performance in a traditional
CIC in a medium-fidelity simulation.  Although the contributions of individual display modules
could not be assessed objectively due to resource limitations, overall effects of the DSS on
decision performance were examined in terms of a variety of performance criteria.
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The results reported here address DSS-1 design issues.  Other findings from this
experiment have been reported elsewhere (Kelly, Hutchins, & Morrison, 1996; Morrison, Kelly,
& Hutchins, 1996).  Again, the DSS-1 did not feature an integrated geo-plot, but it relied on a
geo-plot similar to that used in current tactical systems, provided as part of the DEFTT simulator.
The DSS-1 also had a comparison to norms module, which provided color-coded squares to
show how well a set of critical parameters for the selected track fit a template for known threats
and support pattern matching.  This module was not well liked and was not used as had been
intended.  It was, therefore, dropped from the DSS-2.  The DSS-2 is a refined version of the one
tested, and it was refined based on the results of this study.
As previously discussed, there is substantial evidence that experienced tactical decision
makers employ feature matching and, to a lesser degree, story generation strategies.  Moreover,
various errors observed during tactical scenarios and exercises have been linked with basic
cognitive limitations (memory, attention, etc.).  To build on the naturalistic decision strategies
that experienced COs and TAOs use and to help overcome their cognitive limitations, a series of
decision support modules were developed.  Since these decision support modules were
developed with a user-centered design perspective, we expected that they would be effective in
reducing decision maker errors.  Also, we expected that COs and TAOs would consider these
modules to be useful and easy to use, since they were consistent with the strategies that they use
in processing information and making decisions.
Method
Participants and Support Team
Sixteen active-duty U. S. Navy officers participated in this study as eight CO-TAO teams.
These officers were highly experienced in air warfare tactical decision making, and several were
actual shipboard CO-TAO teams.  The participants had completed the necessary training courses
to be TAO-qualified and had extensive shipboard experience standing watch as a TAO.  Those
participating as the CO were of appropriate ranks for this role (two Captains and six
Commanders), had an average of 20.4 years in the Navy, and had been part of an average of 5.9
deployments.  Similarly, those participating as the TAO held appropriate ranks (five Lieutenant
Commanders and three Lieutenants), had served in the Navy for an average of 12.8 years, and
had deployed an average of 4.0 times, mostly to the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf.
A standard team of enlisted personnel served as the support staff for each CO-TAO team.
These personnel served as Electronic Warfare Supervisor, Identification Supervisor, Tactical
Information Coordinator, and Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator.  They worked at consoles adjacent
to the CO and TAO consoles within the DEFTT Lab.  The support staff were trained to use their
displays and to provide information in a consistent manner across CO-TAO teams, controlling a
major source of extraneous variability.
Materials
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This study was performed in the DEFTT Laboratory at NRaD using dual-screen
workstations for officers participating as the CO and the TAO.  For each, one screen presented a
standard geo-plot, and the other screen presented the DSS-1 display.  Two large screen displays,
comparable to those in many shipboard CICs, were also available.
Two training scenarios and four test scenarios were used.  All scenarios were set in the
Persian Gulf and involved a similar mix of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and surface ships.
The test scenarios, in particular, were constructed to simulate peace keeping missions with a very
high number of targets to be dealt with in a short period of time (i.e., were time compressed) and
with a significant number of highly ambiguous tracks regarding assessment and intent.  Analyses
of the test scenarios indicated that while they differed in many details, they were roughly
equivalent in decision workload overall.  Each of the test scenarios had a duration of
approximately 20 minutes.
Procedures
Upon arriving at the DEFTT Laboratory, participants were given a pre-briefing on the
objectives and procedures for this study, were oriented to the laboratory equipment and staff, and
were provided with necessary reference materials.  Criterion-referenced training with the baseline
DEFTT display system and with the DSS was then provided, and two practice scenarios were run
prior to beginning the test session.
Participants were given appropriate geo-political and intelligence briefings prior to each
test run  and were encouraged to take as much time as necessary in order to set-up their displays
the way that they wanted and to familiarize themselves with the tactical situation.  This was done
in order to reduce the artificiality of feeling as if they were dropped into the middle of a tactical
situation which would normally have developed over several hours.  During the scenario runs,
the activity and communications from both the support team and various external sources was
scripted.  At various points in each scenario, CO-TAO teams were requested to report their
primary tracks of interest.  Subjective workload was assessed immediately following each test
scenario using the NASA Task Load Index (TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988).  Short breaks were
provided between each scenario.
At the conclusion of the last test scenario, each participant was asked to complete a
questionnaire that involved ratings of the usage, utility, and usability of each of the modules and
of the DSS overall.  Then, a brief structured interview was used to solicit comments about the
strengths and weaknesses of the DSS, including suggestions for changing the displays and the
information provided within them.
Experimental Design and Performance Measures
A within-subject factorial design was employed across the four test scenarios such that
each team performed two scenarios with the DSS and two scenarios without it.  In all scenarios,
the CO-TAO team had the use of geo-plot and CRO displays comparable to those in use in
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current ship CICs.  The order of the scenarios and DSS conditions was counterbalanced using a
Latin Square procedure.
In addition to collecting objective data on tactical actions, display usage, control inputs,
and voice communications, subjective assessments, via questionnaires and a structured interview,
were solicited from each CO and TAO at the conclusion of the test session.  The voice
communications for each test scenario run were transcribed and analyzed in order to identify
decision making anomalies and communication patterns.
Results
Several classes of research questions were examined as part of this study.  These concern
DSS utility, situation awareness, team communications, and DSS usability.  While the data
discussed below were subjected to various statistical analyses, care should still be taken in their
interpretation.  The small sample size and the simulated test environment used in this field
research make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about tactical decision making
performance.  Nevertheless, these findings do provide a strong indication of the potential utility
of DSS displays for tactical decision making, particularly in littoral air warfare situations.
DSS Utility
If COs and TAOs considered the DSS to be useful for tactical decision making, we would
expect them to make use of it during the test scenarios when it was available.  Similarly, we
would expect them to report that the information provided by it was useful for their decision
processes.
At 1 minute intervals throughout the test scenarios, subject matter experts recorded
whether or not the COs and TAOs were attending to the DSS.  On the average, participants were
observed to be attending to the DSS at 66% of the time samples.  At the remainder of the time
samples, the COs and TAOs were observed attending to the geo-plot, which was on a separate
display.  In many cases, it was possible to determine to which DSS module(s) they were
attending, and these data are shown in Figure 9.  It can be seen that the COs tended to use the
DSS somewhat more than the TAOs, particularly for purposes of maintaining awareness of
individual track’s behavior, responses completed and pending, and the relative priority of active
tracks.  TAOs, on the other hand, tended to spend more of their time using the DSS to acquire
quantitative track status and sensor data.  Both COs and TAOs tended to use the upper half of the
DSS (i.e., Track Summary, Track Profile, and Response Manager modules) most often.  Self-











































































Figure 9.  Mean Percent of Time where the CO and TAO Attended to DSS Modules
Note: TS = Track Summary, TP = Track Profile, RM = Response Manager, BA = Basis for Assessment,
CN = Comparison to Norms, TL = Track Priority List, AL = Alerts List.
At the completion of the test session, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
that called for a variety of ratings of the DSS.  Figure 10 shows the average ratings (on a 7-point
scale) of how useful the COs and TAOs felt the information provided in the DSS modules was.
Ratings indicate that most modules were considered to be quite useful for tactical decision
making, particularly those parts of the DSS designed to support quick decision making.  COs and
TAOs noted that these modules enabled them to extract key information rapidly and to visualize
track behavior easily.  Participants considered that the DSS overall offered high utility (average
















































































































Figure 10. Mean Rating of the Usefulness of DSS Modules
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Note: TS = Track Summary, TP = Track Profile, RM = Response Manager, BA = Basis for Assessment,
CN = Comparison to Norms, TL = Track Priority List, AL = Alerts List.
Feedback from the CO-TAO teams who participated in this experiment indicated that the
DSS provided them an excellent summary of the overall tactical situation as well as of key data
for individual tracks.  In particular, COs and TAOs considered that both the Track Profile and the
Basis for Assessment modules provided important information not readily available in present
day systems.  Since the Track Profile module supported feature matching, which is the most
commonly used decision strategy, its high rating was anticipated.  Yet, when the track data are
conflicting or ambiguous and when the decision maker has time available, the Basis for
Assessment module was rated as helping substantially.  Note that by encouraging decision
makers to consider the full range of available evidence along with various explanations for it, this
module reduces the likelihood of mistakenly engaging friendly or neutral tracks, and was rated
highly with regard to avoiding Blue-on-Blue and Blue-on-White engagements.
Situation Awareness
Awareness of the tactical situation was examined via several performance measures.
Specifically, it was predicted that if the CO-TAO team was more aware of the tactical situation in
a peace-keeping mission, they would:
• identify the critical contacts earlier and more accurately;
• take more of the defensive tactical actions required by the rules of engagement earlier,
and take more of the provocative (offensive) actions later; that is to say the window of
time during which decision makers had to evaluate and handle a track would increase;
and
• ask fewer questions to clarify previously reported track data and the relative locations
of tracks.
Critical contacts.  During the scenario runs, the CO-TAO team was probed at pre-speci-
fied times to identify the tracks that were considered to be of greatest tactical interest at that time.
Their responses were contrasted with those of an independent group of five subject matter
experts.  As shown in Figure 11, significantly more of the critical contacts were identified when
the DSS was available.  Significant differences (p < .05) were noted at both the early and mid-
scenario probes; performance was comparable at the late probe, however.  Late in the scenario
the critical tracks may become more obvious even without the DSS.  Nevertheless, recognition of
critical tracks earlier in the scenario affords decision makers a broader array of response options



































































Figure 11.  Percent of Critical Contacts Reported as Tracks of Interest
Tactical actions.  Using the rules of engagement as a benchmark for decision performance
in the scenarios, a group of subject matter experts assessed whether the CO-TAO teams warned
and/or illuminated threat tracks at specified times and took appropriate defensive actions.  A
modified form of the Anti-Air Warfare Team Performance Index (ATPI) was used for scoring
tactical performance (after Dwyer, 1992), and these data are summarized in Figure 12.  In
scenarios when the DSS was available, CO-TAO teams were significantly more likely to take
defensive actions in a timely manner against imminent threats (p < .05).  This indicates that the
DSS promoted an earlier recognition of the emerging risks of the tactical situation.  By contrast,
no difference was observed in the number of tracks that were warned or illuminated (i.e.,
provocative actions) when the DSS was available.   However, several subject matter experts
contended that warnings and illuminations may not be diagnostic performance indices in these
scenarios since they represent provocative tactical actions that commanders may consider to be
inappropriate against certain tracks in a littoral situation.  Not taking provocative actions would
be appropriate and expected if commanders had assessed that the track was not an imminent
threat, and felt comfortable with prolonging those actions because they had a good tactical























































Figure 12.  Team Performance of Tactical Actions required by the Rules of Engagement
Team Communications
Although the DSS was primarily designed to support an individual decision maker, the
information that it provides could be expected to influence the team’s collective decision process.
One way that influence could be observed is by changes in the team’s communications.
Therefore, the communications rate, the pattern of communication, and the content of the
communications were compared with and without the DSS.
Communications rate and pattern.  It was hypothesized that when using the DSS, teams
would have less need to exchange data verbally and would, thus, communicate less often.  To test
this, all voice communications that requested or provided information were tabulated for each of
the 32 test runs.  Since the length of the scripted test scenarios differed, the total number of voice
communications observed was divided by the scenario duration to give a communications rate.
Figure 13 shows the mean rate of communications originating with the CO, TAO, other
members of their team, and others external to the ship’s combat center (e.g., the battle group
commander, the bridge).  A general decrease in communications rate with the DSS was observed.
This decrease remains fairly consistent regardless of who originated the communication.  In fact,
the pattern of communications was unaffected by the presence of the DSS.  About 40% of the
communications occurred between the CO and TAO, and another 35% occurred between the
TAO and the team.  Each of the remaining links accounts for about 5% or less of the total
communications.  The decrease in communications across positions suggests that the DSS
supported the entire team by providing basic data about tracks, thereby reducing their need to




































































Figure 13.  Voice Communications Rate by Message Originator and DSS Condition
Communications content.  While the pattern of communications was not found to be
affected by the presence of the DSS, the content of the teams’ communications may be altered by
the DSS.  That is, without the DSS, teams might need to spend more time exchanging basic track
data while those with the DSS might spend the bulk of their time assessing track intent or
evaluating alternate courses of action. To explore the possibility of a qualitative trade-off in
communications, voice communications were coded by their message content according to the
following scheme:
• Information – exchange of sensor-based data;
• Status – exchange of procedure-based data;
• Clarification – redundant communication to elucidate, interpret, or correct other
communications;
• Correlation – association of two or more data;
• Assessment – discussion of expected track behavior, likely intent, or future actions;
• Orders – commands to perform an action.
Figure 14 shows the overall average proportion of communications observed for each of
these content categories.  The largest proportion involved Information communications, in which
sensor-based data were exchanged.  This, of course, is not surprising since these data effectively
drive the decision processes.  The rate of these communications, however, was found to be
significantly lower when the DSS was available (p < .05).  Since the DSS provides much of these
data, there was less need for verbal exchanges among the team.  Similarly, fewer Correlation
communications were observed when using the DSS.  Although decision makers were less likely
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to ask about or report correlation data with the DSS (since much of it is displayed automatically),
they were somewhat more likely to talk about correlations in the data that they observed on the
DSS. This effect is consistent with the intended purpose of the DSS in supporting situation
assessment and track evaluation.  No differences between DSS and No DSS runs were observed






















































Figure 14.  Mean Proportion of Communications by Content Category
Clarification communications.  Overall, about 20% of the communications were for
clarification purposes, reflecting uncertainty about track location, kinematics, identification,
status, or priority.  Figure 15 shows the type of information that was discussed during
clarification communications.  The relative percentage of each type of clarifying communication
is shown when the DSS was available and when it was not available.  Thus, it can be noted that
clarification communications about Track Location (e.g., locating the symbol on the geographic
display that corresponds to the track of interest) and Track Status (e.g., response to warnings)
were equally likely whether or not the DSS was available.  In contrast, clarification
communications about Track Kinematics (e.g., speed or altitude), EW Information (e.g., IFF and
emitter signature), and Tactical Picture (e.g., track identity and relative position) were less likely
when the DSS was available.  Clarifications regarding Ambiguous Orders (e.g., incorrect track
number) were somewhat more likely to occur when the DSS was available.
The pattern of these findings is actually quite revealing about the information in the DSS
that was used by tactical decision makers.  Since the multi-track geo-plot display and the DSS
were not linked in this study, the DSS by itself provided little help in locating tracks in relation to
each other.  Similarly, the DSS provided no information to decision makers about the status of
actions taken or about tracks’ responses to warnings.  Thus, no difference between DSS and No
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Figure 15.  Relative Percent of Clarification Communications With and Without the DSS.
In contrast, the DSS Track Summary module showed available track kinematic data, the
supplementary data read-out in the Comparison to Norms module summarized EW information,
and the Track Profile and Track Priority List modules helped decision makers prioritize and
maintain awareness of the overall tactical picture.  Therefore, the DSS was expected to reduce
the need to clarify these types of information.  Again, these predictions were confirmed,
especially for the EW information that was consulted frequently in making threat assessment
decisions.
Although not statistically significant, the tendency for there to be more clarification
communications about ambiguous orders when using the DSS was interesting.  In fact, we
observed a tendency for decision makers to be more precise in referencing tracks when using the
DSS.  This increased precision thereby encouraged the team to ask for clarification about which
track was being referenced when ambiguous orders occurred.
This detailed analysis of clarification communications confirmed that decision makers did
indeed use the information that was displayed in the DSS, even with only very limited experience
with it.  This analysis also revealed ways in which the DSS might be enhanced to further reduce
the burden of clarification communications.  For example, linking the geo-plot display with the
DSS such that selecting a track on either display would highlight it on the other would probably
reduce the communications to clarify track location.  This enhancement was incorporated into the
DSS-2 design, as previously described.  Similarly, enhancements to the Response Manager
module to show the status of actions and responses by tracks would be likely to reduce the need
for decision makers to repeatedly ask about such track status information.  Current work is
exploring these and other enhancements to the Response Manager module.
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Communications about critical contacts.  The tracks to which the teams’ communications
referred were also examined under the DSS and the No DSS conditions.  The hypothesis was that
the DSS would enable teams to focus on the critical contacts more quickly, resulting in a greater
proportion of their communications about those tracks.  The average proportion of
communications about the critical contacts was slightly greater (but not significant) when using
the DSS.  It is not particularly surprising that these teams concentrated the bulk of their
communications on the critical contacts regardless of whether or not they were using the DSS.
After all, these were highly experienced tactical decision makers who are accustomed to
functioning effectively with their current (non-DSS) systems.  Thus, greater effects might be
obtained with less experienced decision makers.
DSS Usability
Even if the DSS provides useful information, promotes better situation awareness, and
facilitates team communications, it must also be usable.  That is, decision makers should
consider it easy to learn, easy to understand, and easy to use.
Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire following the test session in which
they rated the usability of the DSS and its modules.  Comments about the DSS interface were
also solicited in the questionnaire and during a follow-up interview.  The overall rating of DSS
usability was high (average rating of 4.16 of 5-points).  Similarly, most modules were considered
easy to use, as shown in Figure 16.  The modules that promoted “quick-look” assessments of
track status, location, and priority were rated as more usable.  The modules that were
predominately text-based, particularly the Alerts List, were rated as less easy to use.
The COs and TAOs offered many valuable suggestions for improving the DSS to make it
more useful and usable for tactical decision making and were incorporated into the DSS-2
described above.  Frequently heard suggestions included the need to:
(a) integrate the DSS display with the geo-plot to simplify track selection procedures and to
display multiple tracks,
(b) allow user-customizable display areas and content, particularly for control window size,
range scale, and Response Manager actions,
(c) allow command-override of track priorities and threat assessments, and
















































































































Figure 16. Mean Rating of the Usability of DSS Modules.
Note:   TS = Track Summary, TP = Track Profile, RM = Response Manager, BA = Basis for Assessment,
CN = Comparison to Norms, TL = Track Priority List, AL = Alerts List.
While several of the usability suggestions by experienced tactical decision makers concern
improvements to the “look and feel” of the DSS interface, others have substantial implications
for our understanding of their underlying naturalistic decision processes.  Their call to integrate
the DSS and geo-plot displays and to provide more tracks in the Track Priority List reminds us
that feature matching decision strategies involve evaluating tracks within the context of other
related tracks and events.  Decision makers’ requests to permit them to customize their displays
and to override system defaults have implications for their story generation / explanation-based
reasoning strategies.  Namely, decision makers seem to use a “stepping stone” approach whereby
they use available data to reach an intermediate conclusion about a track, say its priority.  Based
on that intermediate conclusion, they then continue to use other data to explore further
implications for that track, given its priority.  To support such a process, it is clear that decision
makers would want to have the ability to override and customize their DSS displays.
CONCLUSIONS
Operational decision making predominantly relies on feature matching strategies.  To a
lesser extent when faced with conflicting or ambiguous data, decision makers employ story
generation or explanation based reasoning strategies.  Displays that are consistent with these
naturalistic decision making strategies provide the most useful support to commanders,
facilitating the rapid development of an accurate assessment of the situation.  Displays that
support both feature matching and explanation based reasoning are recommended for complex
decision making tasks.  While the feature matching displays will likely be used far more often,
the explanation based reasoning display is of substantial value under certain circumstances,
particularly with less experienced decision makers.
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The DSS was developed for application to Navy tactical decision making on a single ship
in support of Air Warfare in dense, fast-paced littoral settings.  With some adaptation, it could
support other military decision situations, including concurrent decisions involving other warfare
areas, higher-level, supervisory decisions involving multi-ship battle groups, and even
collaboration among tactical decision makers in joint service or multi-national (coalition)
operations.  Several new research projects are underway to explore these applications.  In
addition to these direct applications to support military decision making, the decision support and
display principles identified through this effort are relevant to other complex decision making
settings, such as nuclear power control, flight control, process control, and disaster relief
planning.  Further, additional work is looking at developing derivative displays that reflect
emerging theories of decision making, extension of the DSS concepts to other workstations
within the CIC, as well as better integration of DSS modules with shipboard data processing
systems.
Lessons Learned
1.  Experienced tactical decision makers’ reactions and performance indicated that the
DSS provided them useful information in a readily understood form.  An advantage of the DSS
over current systems is that it supports “quick-look” decision processes (i.e., RPD), which are
typically used in tactical situations.  Naturalistic decision processes are further supported by
presenting data in an operationally relevant context, which involves historical, geo-political, and
tactical doctrine components.
Implications.  A user-centered approach to decision support and display design is
important for achieving user acceptance and ecologically relevant performance enhancements.  A
thorough understanding of the users’ information requirements and decision processes provides a
critical foundation for successful design efforts.  This allows data to be viewed in relation to a
specific decision situation (e.g., embedding a track’s kinematic data in graphical theat templates).
2.  User reactions to the DSS indicated that tactical decision makers appreciated access to
data that were not heavily filtered or preprocessed.  Those algorithms that were implemented
(e.g., the track prioritization algorithm) were kept simple and understandable. Thus, the DSS
makes use of tactical data already available in the CIC without fusion into more complex,
abstract concepts.  This gives the COs and TAOs greater confidence in their decisions, since they
can maintain conceptual links to basic physical data (e.g., a contact’s kinematics - range, speed,
altitude).  The DSS organizes these data around key tasks that tactical decision makers need to
perform.  This display organization makes it easier for experienced decision makers to get the
information that they need quickly and to note inconsistencies or ambiguities in the data.
Because the display is structured around specific operational tasks, decision makers were able to
navigate the display efficiently and extract the required information.  For less experienced
decision makers, the DSS structures their information search so that they are able to better
understand the relationship among the data and how it could be used.  As a result, less
experienced decision makers function more like experts.
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Implications.  Decision support and display design efforts should carefully consider how
automation is incorporated.  Human decision makers require access to the underlying data to
enable situation assessment based on the patterns detected in these data.  A promising design
approach is to organize archival sensor data into modules that support critical decision making
tasks.
3.  DSS display modules that used graphics and that integrated information from several
sources were used most often and were considered the easiest to learn and use.
Implications.  Operational decision making is characterized by time stress, multiple
concurrent task requirements, and situation uncertainty.  Displays that enable decision makers to
recognize data patterns quickly provide substantial support under these conditions.  Whenever
possible, designers should make use of graphic displays and selectable overlays, with color,
shape, size, and position coding schemes.
4.  Early TADMUS research suggested that the user interface to existing tactical display
systems required the decision makers to spend excessive time interacting with displays rather
than making decisions.  Field studies and analyses have revealed that with some current tactical
systems, the user interface dialog places an enormous burden on operators, requiring as much as
a thousand control actions an hour (Osga, 1989).  It was concluded that time spent interacting
with the systems detracts from time available for making tactical decisions.
 
Implications.  Decision support systems should be designed to minimize the amount of
interaction required of the decision maker to extract information.  Interfaces that require the user
to take overt actions in order to obtain information (e.g., selecting between overlapping windows,
activating pop-up windows, using pull-down menus, etc.) interfere with the user’s ability to
process information and should be minimized.  The use of tiled windows, with distinct modules
organized around specific decision making problems is preferred.
5.  Development of the DSS did not follow a simple or straight path.  The design was the
product of extensive discussions among staff from many different disciplines and backgrounds.
In addition, many forms of testing and evaluation of prototype displays were employed – from
table-top critiques to formal evaluation experiments.
Implications.  The design of decision support displays needs to draw on the unique skills
of professionals in many complementary fields, particularly human factors engineers, subject
matter experts, and cognitive scientists.  Iterative testing with representative users needs to be
conducted, in different forms, throughout development.  In the early phases, testing of concepts
can employ storyboards and static mock-ups.  As the design matures, structured feedback from
users can be obtained via scripted scenarios with a dynamic mock-up.  Finally, more formal
laboratory and field studies can be performed with prototype systems to evaluate its
effectiveness.
Implications for Future Training Research
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In addition to its utility as a real-time decision support tool, the DSS may have substantial
value for training the complex cognitive skills that characterize expert tactical decision makers.
Since the DSS organizes and presents tactical data in a form that is consistent with experts’ usage
patterns, it guides decision makers through the huge amount of tactical data available in the CIC.
Essentially, the DSS is expected to help an intermediate decision maker quickly access relevant
data, identify important patterns, and develop a higher level of expertise.  In this regard, the DSS
may be useful not only for initial training but also for refresher or recurrency training.
In a training mode, we envision that the DSS could be central to teaching the application
of tactical decision making skills and developing expertise.  Because the DSS has been designed
to support expert decision makers, it is reasonable to expect that it would prove useful in shaping
the decision making strategies of novice decision makers and developing expert decision making
skills.  There is the implication, however, that there would be a need to call-up particular
scenarios from a library that are appropriate for the tactical decision making skills to be trained.
There would need to be a comprehensive training strategy for developing expert decision making
skills as well as appropriate training objectives and performance criterion. The scenarios would
presumably be sequenced to fit within an appropriate curriculum, leading trainees from more
basic skills to more advanced skills under more demanding tactical situations (i.e., greater
workload, more ambiguity).  Nevertheless, the system could be flexible enough to enable it to
detect a trainee’s level of expertise and particular training needs and then adjust the curriculum
accordingly.  During training, the decision maker could be guided through the use of tactical data
shown on the DSS as the scenario unfolded.  Intelligent agents, wizards, balloon help, or other
such HCI tools could “pop-up” at appropriate points in the scenario to advise trainees on data
relationships, requirements to shift attention, or specific applications of other key tactical skills.
Then, at the conclusion of each training scenario run, key indicators could be calculated in order
to assess decision making performance and provide rapid feedback to the trainee.  The DSS
would also need to include other standard features that support debriefing and evaluation
following training exercises, such as the ability to replay selected parts of the scenario, to view
selected points in time, and to annotate the scenario with comments.
To extend the DSS to support this type of tactical decision making training, several
research and development activities are required, and are being actively pursued as part of the on-
going TADMUS project.  These include:
(a) identification of key tactical decision making skills, knowledge, and abilities,
(b) development of a training curriculum for producing (or sharpening) these skills,
(c) development of a comprehensive library of scenarios that exercise these skills under
various workload demands,
(d) design and testing of intelligent agents, wizards, and other HCI tools that could be
incorporated into the DSS as “over-the-shoulder” advisors or synthetic expert instructors,
and
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(e) investigation of diagnostic decision performance measures that could be compiled
automatically to indicate whether the trainee mastered the skills.
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